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Abstract
Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all 
the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental 
representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresen-
tation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends 
teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 
that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepre-
sentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper 
clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds 
to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, re-
ally do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.
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In “Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental repre-
sentation” (Mendelovici 2013), I argue that a certain prominent class 
of theories of mental representation, tracking theories, have trouble 
allowing for what I call clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, and 
that this is a serious problem for them. In “Teleosemantics and re-
liable misrepresentation,” Marc Artiga (2013) provides an interest-
ing defense of teleosemantics from this argument. Artiga agrees that 
teleosemantics cannot allow for the relevant kinds of clean cases of 
reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for 
the view. This paper clarifies the argument from reliable misrepre-
sentation (section 1) and addresses Artiga’s objections (section 2). If 
I am right, then tracking theories really do need to allow for clean 
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cases of reliable misrepresentation.
1 The argument from reliable misrepresentation
The argument from reliable misrepresentation against tracking theo-
ries proceeds in two steps: Step One argues that tracking theories 
are incompatible with certain kinds of cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation, clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. Step Two argues that 
this is a problem for these views. This section explains key notions 
and presents the two steps of the argument.
1.1 Key notions
Mental representation is the aboutness of mental states. A visual experi-
ence might represent that there is a cup on the table, a thought might 
represent that grass is green, and a desire might represent coffee, or 
that I obtain coffee.1 I will assume that there are mental representa-
tions, which are internal states that are the bearers of representation-
al properties. What a mental representation represents is its content.
Tracking theories of mental representation are theories of mental rep-
resentation that aim to account for mental representation in terms 
of causal or other tracking relations between mental representa-
tions and properties, states of affairs, or other items. My argument 
is aimed at tracking theories in general, but Artiga is exclusively 
interested in defending teleosemantic tracking theories (see Mil-
likan 1984, Papineau 1987), and in particular something close to 
Millikan’s (1984, 1989) version of the theory. My main aim is to 
respond to Artiga’s argument, so I will also focus on teleosemantics 
and a Millikan-esque version of the theory as well. However, much 
of the discussion applies to tracking theories more broadly.
Simplifying considerably, teleosemantics states that a representation 
R represents a content C if it is a normal condition for the systems 
that make use of R (R’s consumers) to perform their proper functions 
1 My favored way of fixing on the phenomenon of mental representation is 
ostensive. See Mendelovici MS: ch. 1 and Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2. See Mende-
lovici MS: ch. 1 for a defense of the claim that other ways of picking out mental 
representation at least aim to include the ostensively defined phenomenon.
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that R corresponds to C. Let us unpack this a bit: Representations 
have producers (or senders) that produce representations and consumers 
(or receivers) that respond to representations. Producers and consum-
ers might be systems in a single organism, or they might occur in 
distinct organisms. An item or system’s proper function is what items 
of its type did in its ancestors that resulted in their being selected 
for by evolution. For example, although a heart may do many things 
(pump blood, make noise, suffer certain kinds of blockages), it is its 
pumping blood that resulted in its being selected, and so its proper 
function is to pump blood. In order for something to perform its 
proper function in the way that it did that resulted in its selection, 
certain conditions have to be in place; these are normal conditions. The 
normal conditions for a heart performing its proper function include 
being part of an intact organism and receiving oxygenated blood. 
Something might perform its proper function while in conditions 
that are not normal (in other words, in abnormal conditions); in this 
case, its success at performing its proper function is in some sense 
accidental.
Like hearts, the consumers of representations have proper func-
tions. It is a normal condition for them to perform their proper func-
tions that they correspond to certain states of affairs, which are their 
contents. Put otherwise, in order for representation consumers to 
perform their proper functions in the way that was selected for by 
evolution, a certain correspondence between representations and 
certain states of affairs had to be in place. Representations represent 
whatever this correspondence maps them onto.2
A characteristic example discussed by Millikan is that of beaver 
tail splashes (see, e.g., Millikan 1989). Beavers splash their tails to 
signal danger, which leads to other beavers taking cover. A tail splash 
at a location at a time is a representation, with the splashing beaver 
being the producer of the representation, and the onlooking beavers 
being the consumers of the representation. If a beaver flees and there 
is danger, the consumer succeeds in performing its proper function, 
which might be to avoid danger, in a normal way. If a beaver flees 
2 A thorough development of Millikan’s teleosemantics can be found in Mil-
likan 1984. See also Millikan 1989 for an overview of some of the key ideas, and 
Shea 2004 for a lucid explanation of the view.
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and there is no danger, the consumer does not succeed in performing 
its proper function in a normal way. The normal condition for the 
proper functioning of the representation’s consumer is that there be 
a correspondence between the location and time of a tail splash and 
the location and time of danger. So, a tail splash at location l and at 
time t represents there is danger at location l and time t. While beaver 
tail splashes are not examples of mental representations, the same 
general principles apply to cases of mental representations.3
1.2 Reliable misrepresentation
It is generally agreed that a theory of mental representation must 
allow for misrepresentation, representation that is false or inaccu-
rate. In Mendelovici 2013: 423, I argue that just as we acknowledge 
hallucination, illusion, and occasional misrepresentation as kinds of 
misrepresentation, we should also recognize another kind of misrep-
resentation: reliable misrepresentation.
3 Millikan, and I assume other advocates of the version of teleosemantics that 
Artiga aims to defend, rejects the view that propositional representations, represen-
tations representing entire putative states of affairs, are built up out of subpropo-
sitional representations, representations representing objects, properties, or other 
subpropositional contents (see, e.g., Millikan 1984: 107). Since normal condi-
tions are entire states of affairs, the contents of mental representations are, in 
the first instance, propositional. (Millikan rejects a language of thought picture 
(Fodor 1975). See Rupert 1999 for discussion.) However, she takes propositional 
representations to have variant aspects and invariant aspects, aspects that do or do 
not vary, respectively, between different representations in the same system. For 
example, a beaver tail splash is a representation with a propositional form, rep-
resenting the propositional content there is danger at location l and time t, for some 
l and t. The representation is part of a system of representations, a system of 
possible tail splashes, which have variant and invariant aspects, aspects that do 
and do not vary, respectively, between different representations in the system. 
The particular location and time can vary, so the aspects of the representation 
corresponding to location and time are variant aspects, while the representation 
of danger cannot vary and so it is an invariant aspect (e.g., beaver tail splashes 
cannot represent the location of elephants, rather than danger). These variant and 
invariant aspects play some of the same roles of subpropositional representations, 
such as that of accounting for productivity. (See Martínez 2013 for discussion.) 
So, for simplicity of exposition, I will take the term ‘representation’ to cover 
these aspects.
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Intuitively, reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in 
the same way all the time (Mendelovici 2013: 422). Reliable misrep-
resentations are not just wrong; they are systematically wrong. Unlike 
hallucination and occasional misrepresentation, reliable misrepre-
sentation is reliable; it involves misrepresenting in the same way all the 
time. Unlike illusion, reliable misrepresentation is not compatible 
with the overall veridicality of tokens of the representation in ques-
tion; tokens of the representation in question are never veridical.
For example, suppose color anti-realism is true and nothing is 
colored. Then, color experiences reliably misrepresent. They rep-
resent that certain objects have certain colors, are always nonveridi-
cal, and occur reliably in the same sets of circumstances (e.g., ripe 
tomatoes tend to trigger representations of redness, a clear daytime 
sky tends to trigger representations of blueness). Color experiences 
get things wrong in the same way all the time. Similarly, suppose 
moral anti-realism is true and nothing is right or wrong. Then, our 
representations of rightness and wrongness reliably misrepresent. 
They represent that certain acts are right or wrong, are always non-
veridical, and occur reliably in the same sets of circumstances (e.g., 
murders tend to be represented as wrong).
While I think reliable misrepresentation is a natural phenomenon 
whose precise boundaries we might only hope to discover by em-
pirically investigating its similarities and differences to other nearby 
phenomena, I will attempt to provide a more precise characteriza-
tion of the phenomenon. Below is what a take to be an improvement 
over my characterization in Mendelovici 2013, discussion of which is 
relegated to a footnote.4
4 Mendelovici 2013b: 423 characterized reliable misrepresentation as follows: 
An organism’s representation of type R reliably misrepresents some property P if 
and only if
(RM1old)  Some tokens of R are involved in attributive mental states that 
represent objects as having property P, 
(RM2old)  Most or all of the relevant objects do not have P, 
(RM3old)  Tokens of R do or would nonveridically represent objects as having 
P in the same types of circumstances on separate occasions.
The three clauses correspond to the three features of reliable misrepresen-
tation: Representation, nonveridicality, and reliability. My proposed amended 
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A representation R representing a property P reliably misrepre-
sents for an organism O if and only if
(RM1) R represents P. (Representation)
(RM2) All of O’s propositional representations that use R to as-
cribe P to something are false. (Nonveridicality)
(RM3) Ascriptions of P using R reliably co-occur with the pres-
ence of some type of state of affairs. (Reliability)
In short, a mental representation reliably misrepresents for an organ-
ism just in case all its attributive uses in that organism are false and 
occur in the same kinds of circumstances.
There are two points worth noting about this characterization: 
First, a representation’s reliably misrepresenting for one organism is 
compatible with the same representation not reliably misrepresent-
ing for another organism. Suppose that color anti-realism is true and 
there are no colored objects on Earth, but there are colored objects 
on Colorful Earth, which is otherwise just like Earth. In this case, 
characterization impoves upon this characterization as follows:
First, as Artiga 2013 rightly points out, (RM2old) is weaker than I intended, 
since it allows the definition to include kinds of cases I do not want to call cases 
of reliable misrepresentation. (This has also been suggested to me by Frédéric-
Ismaël Banville in conversation.) For example, suppose a representation R rep-
resents danger. Since, for many organisms, the cost of failing to flee when there 
is danger is greater than the cost of fleeing when there is no danger, it would be 
no surprise if such organisms would be set up so that most of R’s tokenings will 
be false alarms. It might seem, then, that R would satisfy all the conditions for 
reliable misrepresentation. To avoid this, as Artiga correctly suggests, ‘most or 
all’ in (RM2old) should be changed to ‘all’ and calls the resulting notion that of 
‘strong reliable misrepresentation.’ However, it is not clear to me that this case 
would satisfy the original definition, since it is not clear that the false alarms 
would occur reliably. Presumably all sorts of things could trigger the false alarms, 
so tokens of R would not tend to occur in the same circumstances. However, to 
avoid such worries, I have taken Artiga’s friendly amendment on board.
Second, (RM3old) can be misread as stating that R is nonveridical in the same 
kinds of circumstances, rather than as stating that R occurs and is nonveridical in 
the same kinds of circumstances. My new characterization rules out this potential 
misreading.
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color representations reliably misrepresent for me, but not for my 
Colorful Earth twin.5
Second, a representation R’s reliably misrepresenting is compati-
ble with its occurrence in true propositional representations, so long 
as these propositional representations do not ascribe the property R 
represents to anything. For example, suppose again that color anti-
realism is true and our color representations reliably misrepresent. 
Still, a thought that red is more similar to orange than it is to blue or 
that a particular object is not red might be true.
In the color case, reliable misrepresentation is systematic in a way 
that is not captured by my characterization: Not only does the rep-
resentation of sky-blue misrepresent whenever it is used attributive-
ly, but so too do related representations of other colors. The whole 
system of color representations reliably misrepresents. Whether we 
want to build this into our characterization of reliable misrepresenta-
tion is an interesting question. I take reliable misrepresentation to be 
a natural phenomenon, but it is unclear whether this kind of syste-
maticity would be a feature of this phenomenon (one reason to think 
it might be is that it distinguishes reliable misrepresentation from 
certain kinds of illusions — see fn. 9). In any case, it seems that the 
prime examples of reliable misrepresentation are systematic in this 
way too.
1.3 Step One of the argument
We are now in a position to overview the argument from reliable 
misrepresentation against tracking theories. Step One of the argu-
ment argues that tracking theories of mental representation cannot 
allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation that are supposed 
to get their contents from tracking.6
5 I am characterizing reliable misrepresentation as a feature of types of rep-
resentations that they have relative to organisms that have their tokens. But we 
might, instead, take reliable misrepresentation to be a feature of an organism’s set 
of tokens of a representation or ability to token a representation.
6 Note that this allows that there can be clean cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion of representations that are not supposed to get their contents from tracking, 
e.g., representations that are supposed to get their content compositionally. I set 
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Clean cases of reliable misrepresentation are cases of reliable misrep-
resentation that exhibit the likely features of reliable misrepresenta-
tion (Mendelovici 2013: 429). Since reliable misrepresentations are 
reliable, they are likely to be useful for their bearers, stable across 
generations, and such that they are tokened as a result of a robust 
causal connection, so clean cases of reliable misrepresentation have 
these features. However, this list of features is not meant to provide 
a complete characterization of clean cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation. In getting a clearer idea of the notion, it is helpful to keep 
examples of putative clean cases in mind, such as that of percep-
tual color representations on the assumption of color anti-realism: 
Perceptual color representations form a system of representations, 
all of which misrepresent, occur reliably in the same circumstances 
on multiple occasions, but are useful for their bearers, stable across 
generations, and robustly causally connected to surface reflectance 
profiles. There is nothing “fluky” or contrived about this case. As we 
will soon see, it does not matter for the argument that the notion of 
a clean case of reliable misrepresentation is fuzzy, since, as long as 
there are cases of reliable misrepresentation that a tracking theory 
inappropriately rules out, the theory is in trouble. So this under-
standing of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation will suffice for 
present purposes.
While various tracking theories can allow for cases of reliable 
misrepresentation, the kinds of cases they can allow for are unclean 
in various ways. In the case of teleosemantics, reliable misrepresen-
tation can occur in cases where our environment has changed from 
that of our ancestors. Suppose that our ancestors had an internal 
state, R, that co-occurred with the presence of items having prop-
erty P and that this was helpful for our ancestors’ survival and repro-
duction, so R represents the presence of P. Suppose, further, that P 
is part of a system of representations exhibiting variant and invariant 
aspects, and r is an invariant aspect corresponding to the property P. 
r would then represent P. But suppose now that our environment has 
changed since the time of our ancestors and there no longer are any 
aside such cases in what follows. Step One claims that some representations that 
are supposed to get their contents from tracking are clean cases of reliable mis-
representation.
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Ps. Suppose also that r’s misrepresentation is reliable; representations 
with aspect r occur regularly in some circumstances, say, in the pres-
ence of the property Q. We now have a case of reliable misrepresen-
tation that is compatible with teleosemantics.
However, this setup tends to be unstable: selective pressure turns 
this case of reliable misrepresentation into a case of reliable veridi-
cal representation in subsequent generations. Since mere reliability 
tends to be useful for survival and reproduction (see Mendelovici 
2013: 428-9), r’s co-occurring with P is likely to be helpful to our 
survival and reproduction, and so, in subsequent generations, rep-
resentations involving r will come to represent the instantiation of 
Q , and r itself with come to represent Q. Which descendants will be 
affected will depend on when selective pressure kicks in to preserve 
or change the proper function of the consumers of representations 
involving r, but as soon as such selection takes place, r comes to rep-
resent Q rather than P. The kind of reliable misrepresentation that 
teleosemantics can allow is unstable, giving way to reliable veridical 
representation in one’s descendants. Thus, although teleosemantics 
can allow for reliable misrepresentation, it cannot allow for clean 
cases of reliable misrepresentation. Similar kinds of arguments show 
that other kinds of tracking theories cannot allow for clean cases of 
reliable misrepresentation.7
7 An anonymous reviewer suggests another way in which teleosemantics can 
allow for reliable misrepresentation. As noted above, it is possible for something 
to perform its proper function in abnormal conditions, or “by accident.” This in-
volves performing its proper function by doing something other than what its an-
cestors did that led to its being selected. To borrow an example from Millikan, 
a chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism might have the proper function of 
altering the chameleon’s skin pattern to match what it sits on. A normal condition 
for its proper functioning is that it in fact matches what it sits on. But a chameleon’s 
pigment-changing mechanism might still perform its proper function without 
matching what it sits on; it might cause the chameleon to stand in such stark con-
trast to its surroundings that a passerby feels sorry for it and moves it to a match-
ing surface. The chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism performed its proper 
function, but not in the way that its ancestors did. It performed it “by accident.”
Similarly, a representation’s consumer can perform its proper function in ab-
normal conditions. If the environment changes such that normal conditions no 
longer ever obtain but abnormal conditions do sometimes obtain, a representa-
tion’s consumer might continue to perform its proper function in these abnormal 
Angela Mendelovici66
conditions. The suggestion is that the representation would then reliably misrep-
resent — all its instances would be false and occur in the same abnormal condi-
tions. If there is no selective pressure against this setup, future generations might 
also come to have the same representation that reliably misrepresents.
However, in order for this to be a case of reliable misrepresentation, the repre-
sentation would have to occur in the same abnormal conditions on multiple occa-
sions. While it is possible that it does, it seems more likely that the representation 
would occur in all sorts of different conditions, and that, while sometimes its 
consumers will “get lucky” and perform their proper functions “by accident,” in 
most cases they will not perform their proper functions at all. Consider again 
the lucky chameleon. Suppose the chameleon’s environment changes and all the 
surfaces it can access are colors it cannot match. There are some surfaces it can 
match, but it can only access them by being placed there by a human being. The 
chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism can still perform its proper function, 
but only in abnormal conditions in which a human being feels pity for it and moves 
it to a matching surface. But, unless there happen to be sympathetic bystanders 
attending to it when required, its pigment-changing mechanism will sometimes 
change colors and not perform its proper function at all.
In order for the anonymous reviewer’s case to be one of reliable misrepresen-
tation, the representation in question will have to occur regularly in the abnormal 
conditions. But then if it occurs regularly in the abnormal conditions, and if its 
occurring regularly in these conditions helps its consumers perform their proper 
functions, then it is likely that natural selection will favor preserving the consum-
ers’ behaviors, and the abnormal conditions will become the normal conditions 
for proper functioning in future generations. Since representations represent the 
normal conditions for their consumers’ proper functioning, the representation 
in future generations will no longer reliably misrepresent, but reliably veridically 
represent these new normal conditions. In short, the setup would be unstable.
Returning to the case of the chameleons, suppose that in the new environ-
ment, there are in fact sympathetic bystanders constantly attending to the chame-
leons. The pigment-changing mechanism is now useful to chameleons because it 
changes their skin to a pity-inducing color, which causes humans to move it to safe-
ty. But since the mechanism’s behavior is useful, it is likely that selective pressure 
would help preserve it in future generations. As a result, the present generation’s 
abnormal conditions for the proper functioning of the mechanism will become 
some future generations’ normal conditions. The case is unstable.
Finally, even if the case of reliable misrepresentation were stable across gen-
erations, it would be unclean in other ways. For one, it requires consumers to per-
form their proper functions “by accident,” which is very unlike the prime example 
of a clean case of reliable misrepresentation, that of the reliable misrepresentation 
of colors.
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The tracking theory’s inability to allow for clean cases of reli-
able misrepresentation arises from the fact that tracking theories peg 
veridicality to various kinds of nonsemantic success, kinds of success 
distinct from veridicality. In the case of teleosemantics, a token rep-
resentation is nonsemantically successful when it occurs in the same 
conditions that our ancestors found themselves in when the repre-
sentation was useful for survival and reproduction. This does not 
mean that failure to be nonsemantically successful requires failure 
of a representation’s consumers to perform their proper functions, 
but rather that the normal conditions for performing their proper 
functions do not obtain, so that if they do perform their proper func-
tions, they do so “accidentally.” Unfortunately, for representations 
that are supposed to get their contents directly from tracking, the 
conditions in which a representation is nonsemantically successful 
are of the same type as the conditions that fix the content of the 
representation, so it is impossible to misrepresent in nonsemantically 
successful conditions. This means that whenever misrepresentation 
occurs, something nonsemantic has to have gone wrong. Represen-
tations are never just nonveridical; they are nonveridical and unsuc-
cessful in some other way as well. The problem with clean cases 
of reliable misrepresentation is that nothing nonsemantic has gone 
wrong. Clean cases of reliable misrepresentation are useful, stable, 
and the result of a robust causal relation. Apart from being false, 
they are perfectly well-behaved. Since tracking theories require 
misrepresentation to be accompanied by a nonsemantic defect, and 
since clean cases of reliable misrepresentations are nonsemantically 
successful, tracking theories cannot allow for clean cases of reliable 
misrepresentation.8
Relatedly, we should accept that there are other cases of unclean reliable mis-
representation apart from those described. For example, suppose, for some fluky 
reason, there is never nectar in a certain direction d of any bee hive. Then bee 
dances “stating” that there is nectar in direction d will misrepresent. Suppose fur-
ther that there is an environmental condition that reliably causes bees to dance 
dances “stating” there is nectar in direction d. Then the bees’ representation of d 
will reliably misrepresent, but this will not be a clean case of reliable misrepre-
sentation.
8 Although Mendelovici 2013b does not argue that there are clean cases of 
reliable misrepresentation, I make such arguments in Mendelovici 2013a, 2014, 
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1.4 Step Two of the argument
Step Two of the argument argues that it is a problem for tracking the-
ories that they cannot allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion. This is because a theory of mental representation should allow 
for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. Reliable misrepresenta-
tion is a kind of misrepresentation, just like hallucination, illusion, 
and occasional misrepresentation. Just as it would be inappropriate 
for a theory of mental representation to allow for only contrived 
cases of these other kinds of misrepresentation, it would be inap-
propriate for such a theory to allow for only unclean cases of reliable 
misrepresentation. In Mendelovici 2013b: 436, I claim that it is clear 
from a pretheoretical perspective that a theory of mental representa-
tion should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but I 
also offer two further considerations that support the claim.
The psychological consideration
The first consideration is that allowing for clean cases of reliable mis-
representation offers us the resources needed to make good sense 
of certain kinds of cases in which a representation helps us perform 
various tasks involving the discrimination and re-identification of 
objects, but is also involved in various mistaken inferences. For ex-
ample, our representations of heaviness allow us to discriminate be-
tween objects of different weights and to re-identify objects based on 
how heavy they feel. However, our representations of heaviness lead 
to some mistaken inferences, such as that an object that is difficult 
to lift on Earth will also be difficult to lift on the moon. An appeal-
ing explanation of this pattern of reactions and inferences is that our 
perceptual representations of heaviness reliably misrepresent: they 
represent an intrinsic property of objects but reliably track a rela-
tional property holding between objects and other objects. It is an 
open empirical question whether this is the correct story of repre-
sentations of heaviness; however, it is quite plausible that some rep-
MS: ch. 2. Bourget and Mendelovici 2014 also considers the case for the existence 
of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation and the problems they give rise to for 
tracking representationalism.
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resentations might warrant such a treatment. This possibility should 
not be foreclosed on the basis of a theory of mental representation.
The metaphysical consideration
The second consideration in favor of allowing for clean cases of reli-
able misrepresentation is that failure to do so leads to surprising and 
unwarranted metaphysical conclusions, such as realism about vari-
ous represented properties. The tracking theory licenses inferences 
from the fact that we represent P in nonsemantically successful con-
ditions to realism about P, where realism about P is the view that P is 
instantiated. For example, if we represent colors in nonsemantically 
successful conditions, then the tracking theory allows us to conclude 
that color realism is true. In other words, the tracking theory en-
tails the following conditional for any content P that we represent by 
tracking:
(REAL) If P is represented in nonsemantically successful condi-
tions, then realism about P is true.
(REAL) is a consequence of any theory of mental representation that 
doesn’t allow for misrepresentation in nonsemantically successful 
conditions. The problem is that (REAL) is false. Accepting it is in-
compatible with the normal ways in which we think we should settle 
questions of realism. In cases where the existence or non-existence 
of P is contingent, we normally think that in order to decide on real-
ism about P, we should figure out what would count as an P and then 
check the world for evidence of P. In cases in which the existence of 
P is supposed to be necessary or a priori, different methods apply; for 
instance, we might consider whether P plays certain theoretical roles 
that cannot be played by anything else. But (REAL) allows us to by-
pass these usual methods. We can tell that the antecedent of (REAL) 
is satisfied without figuring out what would count as P and checking 
the world for signs of it, or employing other normal methods for 
finding out about it. All we have to do is check ourselves for experi-
ences of P and check to see if those experiences are nonsemantically 
successful. But this makes establishing realism too easy.
One way to summarize the two considerations is this: Track-
ing theories inappropriately prejudge certain empirical questions, 
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questions concerning certain psychological and metaphysical facts. 
This is inappropriate in part because, despite being touted as “natu-
ralistic” and in line with scientific world views, tracking theories are 
often established without investigating the psychological and meta-
physical facts they prejudge.
Above, I noted that there is some fuzziness in the notion of a 
clean case of reliable misrepresentation. But we can now see why 
this does not affect the argument: The problem is not so much that 
tracking theories cannot allow any instances of a general category of 
misrepresentation, but that there are such instances that they do not 
but should allow.
2 Response to objections
This section overviews and responds to various objections recently 
made in Artiga 2013. Artiga mainly agrees with Step One of my ar-
gument.9 His disagreements are with Step Two.
9 Artiga presents the case of the Ebbinghaus illusion as an example of reli-
able misrepresentation that teleosemantics can account for, although he does not 
claim this is a clean case of reliable misrepresentation, and so he does not take this 
to challenge Step One of my argument. While I agree with Artiga that teleose-
mantics can account for this case, it is not clear to me that it is a case of reliable 
misrepresentation at all. Artiga writes:
[I]n the best-known version of the Ebbinghaus illusion, two circles of identi-
cal size are placed near to each other and one is surrounded by large circles 
while the other is surrounded by small circles; the first central circle then ap-
pears smaller than the second central circle. In this case, the selection and ex-
istence of a mechanism producing representations of size is explained by the 
fact that most of the time it produces the right representations. Nevertheless, 
there is a representation type R (the state that misrepresents the size of [the] 
inner circle in the Ebbinghaus scenario) that reliably and systematically mis-
represents a certain configuration. This state R, which reliably misrepresents 
an inexistent size of certain circles, is a by-product of the representational 
system that has earned its keep in evolution. This is a sort of case involving 
strong reliable misrepresentation that can be perfectly accommodated within 
teleosemantics. (2013: 270-1, footnote suppressed)
There are two ways of understanding what Artiga takes R to represent. On 
one interpretation, R represents “the size of [the] inner circle,” (271) but on an-
other interpretation, R represents “a certain configuration” (271). On the first 
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reading, R is not a case of reliable misrepresentation, since many occurrences of 
the representation of the particular size in question are veridical. For example, a 
circle outside the context of an Ebbinghaus illusion might trigger a representation 
of a circle as being that size. On the second interpretation, R is a representation 
of the entire configuration of the inner and outer circles. Now, R should not be 
a propositional representation to the effect that there is such-and-such arrange-
ment of circles, since the characterization of reliable misrepresentation only ap-
plies to representations of properties. Instead, it should represent a property that 
captures the arrangement of circles. For example, perhaps R represents a prop-
erty attributed to space, that of containing such and such an arrangement of circles. Or 
perhaps R represents a property attributed to sets of objects, that of being circles ar-
ranged in such and such way. Then, one might argue, R, which represents some such 
property, misrepresents every time it is tokened in a particular individual and sat-
isfies the other conditions on reliable misrepresentation. However, I don’t think 
it’s clear that we have representations that represent such properties. While it is 
plausible that the representational states we have while viewing the Ebbinghaus 
illusion involve a representation representing the size of the inner circle, repre-
sentations representing the size of the outer circles, and a representation that 
there are such and such circles standing in such and such relations before us, it is 
not clear that we also count as having a representation corresponding to the com-
posite properties discussed above. This would require that the representations 
representing the sizes of the inner circle and the outer circles come together in a 
way that qualifies them as a further representation without thereby representing 
an entire proposition. This would be analogous to a beaver’s tail splash represent-
ing danger at location l and time t involving a representation or aspect representing l 
and t. It is an empirical question whether we have such a representation (or aspect 
of a representation), but I am doubtful.
A better example of a persistent illusion that might be a case of reliable mis-
representation is the experience of the Penrose triangle, since in this case it is 
more plausible that we have a single representation representing an (impossible) 
shape property. However, this kind of case is very different from paradigm cases 
of reliable misrepresentation, and might, at best, point to an inadequacy of the 
characterization of reliable misrepresentation. In paradigm cases of reliable mis-
representation, such as the case of color, misrepresentation is not merely a special 
case of a system of representations that might be otherwise generally veridical, 
but is instead a feature of the core cases of the system of representations. Ad-
ditionally, if reliable misrepresentation is to be contrasted with illusions, then 
illusions should not generally qualify as cases of reliable misrepresentation.
A further condition that we might add to the characterization of reliable mis-
representation to rule out persistent illusions is the requirement that all represen-
tations of properties in a system of representations satisfy the first three condi-
tions of reliable misrepresentation (see section 1.2). Alternatively, we could say 
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That’s just what the theory says!
Artiga writes:
I agree [that the possibility of stable cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion] is certainly ruled out by teleosemantics; according to the theory, 
R represents Q iff Q causally explains the selection of the mechanism 
producing R. However, that does not seem to be an unwelcome result, 
but just a different way of stating the theory. If R represents whatever 
feature explains its selection, it cannot happen that a feature explains 
its selection and it is not represented by R. Why should that be a prob-
lem? (2013: 273)
I’m not sure if the teleosemanticist needs to say that represented 
properties causally explain the selection of the mechanisms produc-
ing the representation in question, but I do agree that she is commit-
ted to represented properties playing some causal role in selecting 
for a representation’s producing or consuming systems. I’m also not 
sure that teleosemantics needs to be committed to providing neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for mental representation, rather than 
just sufficient conditions that apply to us. But these quibbles are in-
consequential to Artiga’s point, which is just that the impossibility 
of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation is part of what teleose-
mantics says. It’s not an objection to a theory that it says what it says. 
Artiga also puts the point in a different way:
Every theory, teleosemantics a fortiori, is such that whatever meets 
the sufficient conditions for being an F according to a theory is an F 
according to the theory… In teleosemantics, those sufficient condi-
tions involve a process of reliability and stability for a period sufficient 
for selection of the sender-receiver configuration. Consequently, it is 
that this is not a clean case of reliable misrepresentation, perhaps on the basis of 
the fact that it is an isolated case of misrepresentation in an otherwise generally 
veridical system.
In any case, it does not really matter if persistent illusions are clean cases of 
reliable misrepresentation, since Artiga and I agree that, regardless of how they 
are classified, they are cases that teleosemantics can accommodate, and also that 
there are other cases that teleosemantics cannot accommodate. Our disagree-
ment is over whether it is problematic that teleosemantics cannot accommodate 
the latter cases, not over whether some other cases that it can accommodate 
should be classified as the same type of case on some method of classification.
73Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation
certainly true that teleosemantics rules out a case in which Q is the 
property that accounts for the selection of R and R does not represent 
Q… (2013: 273)
Although Artiga does not put things in quite this way, one way to 
understand his complaint is as being that the objectionable conse-
quence of teleosemantics (its inability to allow for clean cases of reli-
able misrepresentation) is an immediate consequence of the theory, 
and objecting to a theory on the basis of its immediate consequences 
is question-begging, since it would not convince anyone who accepts 
the theory.
It is true that the failure to allow for clean cases of reliable mis-
representation is a consequence of teleosemantics. It is also true that 
it is possible to reformulate teleosemantics and the conditions in 
which the relevant kinds of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation 
occur such that this consequence can be recognized fairly immedi-
ately. Perhaps, on some ways of understanding teleosemantics and on 
some ways of understanding the allegedly problematic consequence, 
teleosemantics and the problematic consequence are equivalent. 
However, this is neither here nor there. A consequence of a theory 
is a consequence of a theory, no matter how immediate or how obvi-
ous it is on various formulations of the theory and the consequence. 
The question that should concern us is whether the consequence is 
acceptable. In Step Two of my argument, I offer specific reasons for 
thinking that the consequence is unacceptable. One reason is that 
it precludes certain kinds of explanations of certain patterns of re-
actions and inferences. Another reason is that it warrants certain 
inappropriate metaphysical conclusions. Another, fairly flat-footed, 
but I think compelling, reason is that reliable misrepresentation is 
a type of misrepresentation, just like occasional misrepresentation, 
hallucination, and illusion, and insofar as a theory should allow for 
uncontrived cases of any kind of misrepresentation, it should allow 
for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. The mere fact that some 
claim is a consequence, or even a direct consequence, of a theory 
does not make it immune from criticism.
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Objection to the psychological consideration
Artiga (2013: 274, fn. 5) addresses the psychological reason for al-
lowing for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. The claim from 
Mendelovici 2013b under dispute is that reliable misrepresentation 
might be the best explanation of certain patterns of reactions and 
inferences, so we should not rule out the possibility of this sort of 
explanation on the basis of a metaphysical theory of mental represen-
tation. Artiga objects that, since certain (unclean) cases of reliable 
misrepresentation are allowed by teleosemantics, this form of expla-
nation is not in fact ruled out.
All this is true. However, the relevant kind of explanation is only 
allowed in cases involving instability, that is, cases in which the rel-
evant patterns do not persist over enough generations for there to be 
the kind of selective pressure that could confer a change in content 
to the representation in question. In stable cases, cases in which the 
relevant patterns persist over generations in the relevant way, the 
patterns cannot be explained in the way I describe. Since the reasons 
for wanting to allow for the kinds of explanations I describe have 
nothing to do with instability, it is inappropriate to restrict their ap-
plication to unstable cases.
The allegedly inappropriate metaphysical consequences are 
just fine if we assume teleosemantics
Artiga takes issue with the metaphysical consideration in favor of al-
lowing for reliable misrepresentation. Recall that my worry is that 
tracking theories entail (REAL).
(REAL) P is represented in nonsemantically successful condi-
tions, then realism about P is true.
The problem is that (REAL) licenses inappropriate inferences from 
claims that we represent P in nonsemantically successful conditions 
to realism about P, which is in tension with how we generally think 
we can and cannot settle questions of realism.
Artiga agrees that the tracking theory licenses such inferences, 
but disagrees that this is a problem if we assume teleosemantics.
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In teleosemantics ‘P is represented in non-semantically successful con-
ditions’ should be spell[ed] out as the claim that P was the property that 
accounted for the selection of the sender-receiver system. Hence, the 
problem should be cashed out as follows: if teleosemantics is right and 
P is the property that accounts for the existence and selection for the 
system, then one is committed to the (past) existence of P. Again, this 
conditional seems true, but also entirely plausible. If a property P ac-
counted for the existence of the representational system, P must have 
been instantiated somewhere. (2013: 275, footnote suppressed)
Artiga offers further reasons for thinking that it is okay to assume 
that represented properties were instantiated, which I will turn to 
shortly. But let us consider this argument first. Artiga is claiming 
that, from the perspective of the teleosemanticist, the allegedly un-
warranted inference that is licensed by the tracking theory is in fact 
entirely warranted. This is because the teleosemanticist understands 
the antecedent of (REAL) as equivalent to ‘P was the property that 
accounted for the selection of my sender-receiver system,’ which 
makes (REAL) equivalent to (REAL´ ).10
(REAL´ ) If P was the property that accounted for the selection 
of my sender-receiver system, then realism about P is true.11
While (REAL) seems to be in tension with our ordinary ways of 
finding out whether realism is true, (REAL´ ) does not. However, 
this does nothing to show that (REAL) is unproblematic. This is be-
cause (REAL´ ) does not have the objectionable features of (REAL); 
it does not commit itself to a questionable connection between what 
10 The teleosemanticist has room to deny that ‘P is represented in non-seman-
tically successful conditions’ is equivalent to ‘P was the property that accounted 
for the selection of the sender-receiver system’ if she claims to only provide suf-
ficient conditions for mental representation and not necessary conditions or if she 
weakens the modal strength of her theory, but I set this aside for now and assume 
that the teleosemanticist accepts this equivalence.
11 For present purposes, we can assume that the past existence of P is suffi-
cient for realism about P. However, if the antecedent of (REAL´ ) is suitably cashed 
out so as to fully capture the commitments of the antecedents of (REAL´ ) assum-
ing teleosemantics, it would also state or entail that my sender-receiver system is 
stable in the relevant way and that I have tokens of the internal states tracking P. 
This would entail the present instantiation of P.
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we represent in nonsemantically successful conditions and realism.
The situation is analogous to the following: Suppose the I’m Psy-
chic Theory claims that I imagine something iff it’s true. This theory 
entails (PSYCH):
(PSYCH) If I imagine that P, then P.
One might object to (PSYCH) in various ways; for one, it is incom-
patible with how we normally think we can come to know about 
future events. Normally, we predict the future on the basis of pres-
ent events and theories about what kinds of events they might give 
rise to. But (PSYCH) allows me to bypass such tedious methods and 
predict the future solely based on what I imagine, which may have no 
causal connection to the alleged future events I predict. According 
to the I’m Psychic Theory, however, I imagine something iff it’s true. 
So ‘I imagine that P’ is equivalent to ‘P,’ and (PSYCH) is equivalent 
to (PSYCH´):
(PSYCH´) If P, then P.
(PSYCH´) is clearly true and has no objectionable epistemological 
consequences. But this does nothing to show that (PSYCH) is true 
and similarly unobjectionable. (REAL) and (PSYCH) serve as bridge 
premises linking claims about representation and imagination, on 
the one hand, and claims about realism and truth, on the other. But 
(REAL´ ) and (PSYCH´) are not bridge premises; they operate only on 
one side of the relevant chasm, the realism/truth side. So, (REAL´ ) 
and (PSYCH´) do not have the objectionable features of (REAL) and 
(PSYCH). We can see this clearly by noting that (REAL´ ) makes no 
mention of mental representation and (PSYCH´) makes no mention 
of imagination.
Innately represented properties must have been instanti-
ated in the past
In his paper, Artiga argues that the following principle is true:   
(PAST) If a property P is innately represented, P was instantiated 
in the past.
The argument for (PAST) proceeds by attempting to show that 
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(PAST) receives widespread and legitimate endorsement by scien-
tists and philosophers. If it is unobjectionable to assume (PAST), this 
might motivate the claim that (REAL) is unobjectionable indepen-
dently of Artiga’s previous argument. The problem, however, is that 
there is little reason to think that (PAST) receives widespread and 
legitimate endorsement.
As an example of the endorsement of (PAST) in philosophy, Ar-
tiga cites an objection to Fodor’s (1975) concept nativism:
Some people have suggested that human concepts like carburetor or 
television cannot be innate because if they were, we would have to ac-
cept that there were carburetors and televisions at the time our ances-
tors evolved (Sterelny 1989; Prinz 2002: 229). (2013: 275)
However, this is not in fact the argument that Sterelny and Prinz 
make. They argue that concepts like carburetor are not innate as 
follows: Innate representations have to be selected for. In order for 
a representation to be selected for, it has to have been useful to our 
ancestors. But concepts like carburetor would not have been useful 
to our ancestors. So, they could not have been selected for. So, they 
are not innate.12 Sterelny and Prinz’s line of argument does not as-
sume (PAST).
Sterelny and Prinz’s argument is more compelling than Artiga’s 
suggested reconstrual. The problem with thinking that carburetor 
was selected for is not that there were no carburetors in our an-
cestors’ environment, but that the concept carburetor would have 
been useless for our ancestors. Now, perhaps part of the reason why 
the concept would have been useless for our ancestors is that there 
were no carburetors, but this is neither here nor there. The concept 
could have been useless even if there were carburetors (indeed, it is 
arguably useless to many people who have it today), and the concept 
12 Prinz writes: “If prevailing theories of evolution are true, innate repre-
sentational resources must be either selected for or generated as an accidental 
by-product of things that were selected for. A concept like spatula could not have 
been selected for, because it would have conferred no survival advantage in the 
environments in which humans evolved.” (2002: 229)
Similarly, Sterelny writes: “innate concepts require a selective explanation; 
an explanation showing that very concept conferred a reproductive advantage on 
our ancestors.” (1989: 123, emphasis in original)
Angela Mendelovici78
could have been useful even if there were no carburetors (Mende-
lovici 2013b offers examples of such cases). Usefulness and accuracy 
can come apart, and it’s usefulness that matters for selection, not 
accuracy (except insofar as accuracy confers usefulness).
As an example of the endorsement of (PAST) in science, Artiga 
presents the debate over the innateness of a fear of spiders. A con-
sideration against the claim that a fear of spiders is innate is that only 
a small percentage of spiders are poisonous, and so a fear of spiders 
would not confer a significant selective advantage and would not 
have been selected for. Thus, it is not innate. Artiga takes this line 
of argument to assume (PAST). But it clearly does not for the same 
reason that Sterelny and Prinz’s arguments do not assume (PAST). 
What is required for a fear of spiders to be selected for is that it is 
useful to our ancestors, not that it represents accurately. A represen-
tation’s usefulness and accuracy can come apart, allowing for useful 
inaccurate representations and accurate useless representations.
In summary, Artiga’s arguments for the claim that (PAST) re-
ceives widespread and legitimate endorsement among philosophers 
and scientists are unsuccessful. As I’ve argued, considered endorse-
ment of (PAST) is neither widespread nor legitimate.13
We don’t know what we represent through introspection
In Mendelovici 2013b, I provide a specific example of the kind of 
argument (REAL) licenses:
(P1) I represent redness. (Introspective observation)
13 Although Artiga’s paper suggests that the principle he aims to defend is 
(PAST), in conversation, he has suggested a weaker principle:
(PAST-weak) If a property P is innately represented, P is likely to have been 
instantiated in the past.
The claim that (PAST-weak) receives legitimate and widespread endorsement 
is more plausible. However, this wouldn’t help the teleosemanticist, since (PAST-
weak) is too weak to legitimize (REAL). (REAL) does not claim that realism 
about properties represented in nonsemantically successful conditions is likely to 
be true, but rather that realism about such properties is true.
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(P2) My representations of redness occur in nonsemantically suc-
cessful conditions. (Uncontroversial empirical assumption)
(REAL) If P is represented in nonsemantically successful condi-
tions, then realism about P is true. (From a tracking theory)
(C) Therefore, realism about redness is true.
Importantly, both (P1) and (P2) can be known without examining 
the world for traces of redness. (P1) can be known through intro-
spection, and (P2) can be known through examination of the useful-
ness, stability, and robustness of our representation. We can assume 
that the tracking theorist accepts that we can also know that a track-
ing theory is true, and hence that (REAL) is true, without examin-
ing the world for redness.14 The worry, then, is this: The tracking 
theory allows us to move from an introspective observation and an 
uncontroversial empirical claim to realism about redness, without 
even requiring us to examine the world for redness. This is incom-
patible with our ordinary ways of settling questions of realism.
Artiga agrees that teleosemantics allows one to move from (P1) 
and (P2) to (C), but maintains that this is unobjectionable. He sug-
gests that I think that (P1) and (P2) are a priori and that this is pre-
cisely what bothers me.15 But this is not what I think and this is not 
14 David Bourget has suggested to me that the tracking theorist could respond 
that we are not in a position to know that (REAL) is true without first deter-
mining that realism about properties represented in nonsemantically successful 
conditions is true. If this is right, then it is not problematic that (REAL) licenses 
a move from (P1), (P2) to (C), since properly justifying (REAL) requires already 
knowing the truth of (C). This is an interesting line of response on behalf of the 
tracking theorist, though, as Bourget points out, it comes with the unfortunate 
consequence that tracking theories have been accepted on inadequate evidence 
all along. In order to properly justify a tracking theory, it is not enough to show 
that it adequately accounts for cases of beavers, frogs, magnetotactic bacteria, and 
even some cases of beliefs and desires; the tracking theorist must also argue for 
realism about colors and other represented properties.
15 Artiga writes: “Since P1 and P2 seem to be a priori and C is clearly a pos-
teriori, if we accept that P1-[(REAL)] entail C, we will be entitled to conclude 
a substantive and a posteriori claim about the world (color realism) from certain 
a priori claims and teleosemantics. I think this is precisely what worries Mende-
lovici…” (2013: 277)
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what bothers me. Nowhere do I say that (P1) or (P2) are a priori.16 
(P1) is a posteriori because it is known through experience, even 
though the relevant experience is introspection.17 (P2) is a poste-
riori because it is also known through experience; the fact that it is 
uncontroversial does not make it a priori. The problem is not that a 
posteriori conclusions can be drawn from a priori premises, but that 
questions of realism can be settled on the basis of a theory of mental 
representation and a posteriori but fairly innocuous and easily justi-
fied claims like (P1) and (P2).
Nevertheless, Artiga’s response to his apparent misconstrual of 
my argument can also be offered as a response to the argument I 
actually make. His response is that once we appreciate the kind of 
empirical examination required to establish (P1) and (P2), it should 
not be surprising or objectionable that a theory of mental representa-
tion allows us to conclude from them that color realism is true:
Teleosemantics is an externalist theory about content, so P1 and P2 
are a posteriori claims through and through. What kind of property 
I am representing with a red experience and what kind of situations 
16 Mendelovici 2013b writes: “The trouble is not that tracking theories allow 
us to infer a posteriori truths from a priori truths, but rather that they allow us to 
make inferences that it seems we should not be able to make, whether or not any 
of the premises we use are a posteriori.” (440)
Artiga acknowledges that I deny that my worry concerns moving from a prio-
ri premises to a posteriori conclusions, but interprets the following passage from 
my paper as nonetheless supporting his interpretation: “But if tracking theories 
are correct, then in order to establish realism about represented property P, we 
needn’t check the world for evidence of instances of P. We can instead check 
ourselves for nonsemantically successful instances of the representation of P.” 
(Mendelovici 2013b: 437-8) It might sound like my claim that, on the tracking 
theory, “we needn’t check the world for evidence of instances of P” in order to 
draw realist conclusions about P means that the tracking theory allows us to draw 
realist conclusions about P without checking the world at all, i.e., a priori. But 
being able to draw realist conclusions about P without checking the world for P is 
compatible with having to check the world for something in order to draw realist 
conclusions about P. What we have to check the world for is the truth of (P1) and 
(P2), which, as I claim in my paper, does not require checking the world for P.
17 Like Millikan, Artiga takes introspective knowledge of our own mental 
states to count as a priori, so Artiga’s disagreement with me over whether such 
introspective knowledge is a priori is likely merely terminological.
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are nonsemantically successful conditions (i.e. what sort of situations 
accounted for the selection of the mechanism) are hard empirical ques-
tions that should be resolved by science. Consequently, even if teleose-
mantics is right, a considerable amount of empirical knowledge must 
be gathered before anything like C can be established. (2013: 278)
In order for this kind of response to successfully respond to the argu-
ment I actually made, it should show that establishing the conjunc-
tion of (P1) and (P2) requires establishing that color properties are 
instantiated through normal, presumably empirical, methods. We 
should be clear that everyone should grant that there are ways of 
establishing (P1) and (P2) that would proceed via establishing that 
color properties are instantiated — for instance, we could establish 
that (P2) is true by establishing that in nonsemantically successful 
conditions, color properties are instantiated and then establishing 
that we find ourselves in such nonsemantically successful conditions. 
But the question is not whether there are ways of establishing ei-
ther (P1) or (P2) that proceed via first establishing color realism, but 
rather whether there are ways of establishing (P1) and (P2) that do 
not require first establishing color realism. I claimed that there are.
Let us consider both premises separately to see if there is reason 
to think that establishing either premise requires establishing color 
realism. For teleosemantics, a representation’s nonsemantically suc-
cessful conditions are what we might call its design conditions, the type 
of conditions in which the representation’s occurrence in our ances-
tors helped them survive and reproduce. Now, one way of establish-
ing that we represent colors in design conditions is by first finding 
out precisely what the relevant design conditions are and then estab-
lishing that we represent colors in those conditions. This way of es-
tablishing (P2) would indeed involve establishing color realism prior 
to accepting (P2), since design conditions would have to involve the 
instantiation of color properties. (This is the way Artiga seems to 
have in mind when he says in the above quotation that “what kind of 
situations are nonsemantically successful conditions (i.e. what sort 
of situations accounted for the selection of the mechanism)” is an 
empirical question to be settled by science.) However, another way 
of establishing that we represent colors in design conditions is by 
first establishing that representing colors aids us in our survival and 
reproduction in reliable and systematic ways and then inferring from 
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this that being in the same kinds of states helped our ancestors in 
the same ways. Unlike the way Artiga seems to have in mind, this 
perfectly good way of establishing (P2) does not require that we first 
establish color realism.
Let us now turn to (P1). Does establishing (P1) require first es-
tablishing that color realism is true? There are several ways of es-
tablishing what we represent without first having to establish that 
what we represent is true, exists, or is instantiated. Perhaps the most 
obvious way comes from introspection: In some cases, introspection 
affords us access to the contents of our representational states; it tells 
us which contents we represent. The case of conscious representa-
tional states, such as conscious thoughts or perceptual experiences 
representing redness, seem to be good candidates for states that al-
low for this kind of introspective access. It is important to note that 
none of this requires that introspection can reveal the content of all 
mental representations (perhaps we have non-conscious representa-
tions that are introspectively inaccessible), or that introspection is an 
infallible guide to content. All that is required is that, in some cases, 
introspection provides us fairly good evidence that we represent cer-
tain contents. Assuming the case of color representation is one of 
those cases, then this is enough to establish (P1), the claim that we 
represent colors.18
Artiga (and Millikan) reject the claim that introspection provides 
special access to representational states, so they would not accept 
this way of establishing (P1).19 I think this position is overly skeptical 
18 This also does not require that introspection can reveal the metaphysi-
cal nature of mental representational states or their contents. See Mendelovici 
forthcoming and Mendelovici MS: ch. 1, where I argue that introspection can at 
least sometimes tell us which contents we represent without revealing to us their 
metaphysical nature (e.g., whether they are sets of possible worlds or structured 
propositions) or the metaphysical nature of mental representation in general (e.g., 
whether it is a tracking relation, a relation to abstract entities, a relation to sense 
data, or a non-relational state of subjects).
19 As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, a central part of Millikan’s view 
is the denial of what she calls “meaning rationalism,” which includes the view that 
introspection and intuition provide insight into the contents of our representa-
tional states (see especially Millikan 1984: 91-2 and 326-7). However, meaning 
rationalism involves a commitment to the infallibility of introspection, which I do 
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about introspection. That I represent colors is immediately obvious 
to me. I need not consider my dispositions to make inferences or 
behave, or my social or physical environment in order to know that 
I represent colors. That we represent colors is a datum, one that a 
theory of mental representation has to explain. Further, one might 
argue, it is through introspection that we get a grip on mental repre-
sentation in the first place, and this way of getting a grip on mental 
representation automatically affords us some pre-theoretic access to 
mental representational states. But this is not the place to argue for 
these claims.20 Instead, let me turn to another way in which we can 
find out about the contents of our representational states without 
introspecting upon them: by observing their psychological roles.21
not need in order to make my argument.
Millikan’s own view of self-knowledge is, roughly, that knowledge of what our 
concepts represent is a matter of our (fallible) abilities to tell that two thoughts 
represent the same content (Millikan 2000: chs. 10 and 13). “Knowing what I am 
thinking of is being capable of coidentifying … various of my thoughts with other 
thoughts of the same. It is being able to distinguish thinking of a thing again from 
thinking of a different thing.” (Millikan 2000: 184) (See also Shea 2002 for an 
overview.) Millikan does claim that this picture is only “[t]he closest thing that 
actually makes some sense … to the yearned-for ideal of comparison of a thought 
with its object bare within thought itself ” (2000: 184), but it is not clear that it 
comes close at all, since it only seems to deliver knowledge that two concepts 
represent the same unknown thing, and knowing that two concepts represent 
the same content does not help you know what that content is if you have no prior 
access to either thought’s content. The kind of knowledge we obtain is analogous 
to the knowledge we obtain by learning that two words whose meaning we do 
not know are synonymous.
20 See Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2, MS: ch. 1, and Kriegel 2011: ch. 1.
21 Artiga’s rejection of introspection involves conceding that externalist 
views like teleosemantics are in tension with introspective self-knowledge. He 
suggests that this tension shows there is nothing new about my argument, since 
we already knew that externalist theories like teleosemantics are in tension with 
introspective self-knowledge (2013: 278). Of course, that externalism is incom-
patible with introspective self-knowledge is not what my argument intends to 
show. My argument assumes a premise that is accepted by most participants on 
the debates concerning introspective self-knowledge, which is that there is such 
a thing as introspective self-knowledge, and attempts to show that together with 
other assumptions, this gives rise to consequences concerning color realism and 
other forms of realism. My overall argument is meant to show that clean cases 
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Mental representational states play certain psychological roles, 
including roles in inference, behavior, and the formation of higher-
order thoughts about them. For example, from representing that 
some object has a particular color, we are likely to represent that it 
doesn’t have certain other colors, that it is a visible object, and that it 
is similar to or different from other objects. We might utter certain 
words, like ‘This is red,’ or approach or avoid it. We might form a 
higher-order thought with the content I am thinking about a red tomato. 
From these and other similar facts, we can home in on the content of 
color representations without requiring us to know whether colors 
are in fact instantiated. Again, this method does not need to be fool-
proof in order to provide sufficient evidence for (P1).22
of reliable misrepresentation are incompatible with tracking theories of mental 
representation and that this is a problem for them. So, my argument does not boil 
down to pointing out the tension between externalism and introspective self-
knowledge. More generally, when one responds to an argument by biting a bullet, 
one cannot conclude that the aim of the argument was to establish the bullet.
Artiga also suggests that if the worry boils down to a worry about the com-
patibility of tracking theories with introspective self-knowledge, then it is a prob-
lem for any externalist theory, not just teleosemantics or tracking theories more 
generally, so “a defense will have to come from externalism, rather than from 
teleosemantics.” (2013: 278) Of course, a problem for everyone is not a problem 
for no one, so, to the extent to which accommodating introspective self-knowl-
edge is a problem for externalism, it is a problem for tracking theories, including 
teleosemantics. In any case, tracking theories are the main contenders for exter-
nalist theories of meaning, so even if my argument did boil down to pointing out 
the tension between externalism and self-knowledge, and even if a problem for 
all versions of a theory is not a problem for any specific version of that theory, 
the worry would still be a fair one to raise against my target, which is tracking 
theories in general.
22 One might object that knowing that we make inferences with a certain 
content or have higher-order thoughts requires introspection of that content, so 
although this method allows us to avoid introspection upon the representational 
states we want to know about, it does not avoid introspection entirely. I agree 
that the most natural ways of finding out whether you are making a particular 
inference is to introspect, and the most natural way of finding out whether some-
one else is making an inference with a particular content is to ask them whether 
they are, which will prompt them to introspect and then report on what they 
find. This dependence on introspection of the most natural way of finding out 
about what inferences we make illustrates the far-reaching consequences of re-
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More generally, the tracking theorist should accept that there is 
a theory-independent way of finding out what we represent, a way 
that doesn’t require first finding out what we track on their favored 
tracking theory. As long as this way does not require establishing 
realism about represented properties, we have a way of establishing 
(P1) independent of establishing realism about redness, and we have 
an argument for color realism that bypasses the normal ways of find-
ing out whether realism is true. I will return to this point shortly.
We don’t know through introspection that we represent
Artiga argues that the rejection of color realism is compatible with 
teleosemantics and the validity of the argument from (P1), (P2), and 
(REAL) to (C):
[I]f we assume teleosemantics and grant everything I accepted in this 
paper (including the inference from P1-[(REAL)] to C), is teleoseman-
tics still compatible with color eliminativism? It clearly is. If science dis-
covers that there is nothing our color experiences have been tracking, 
then teleosemantics has to say that the mechanism that produces our 
color experiences is not a representational mechanism. That is, it is pos-
sible that color experiences are not representational states. (2013: 278)
The suggestion is that we could discover that our color experienc-
es don’t bear the relevant tracking relation to anything at all, and 
so, we could discover that we don’t represent colors after all. (P1) 
would then be false, which would block the argument to color real-
ism (which would also be false) in a way that is fully compatible with 
teleosemantics.
However, the same considerations that support the claim that 
color representations represent colors also support the weaker claim 
that they represent something. We can know from introspection that 
our representations of redness are not empty, that they in fact have 
contents. It is introspectively obvious that we think something when 
we think about colors. (This is something that Artiga and Millikan 
jecting introspection. But presumably the skeptic about introspection will allow 
that there are other ways of finding out about what inferences we make, perhaps 
through our behaviors. Something similar can be said for how we know about our 
higher-order states.
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would deny. But surely the psychological role of color representa-
tions or other considerations that do not require realism about colors 
can help establish that color representations represent something.)
Incidentally, the suggestion that our (pseudo-)representations 
do not represent anything at all has unwanted consequences for the 
tracking theorist. While it allows her to deny color realism, it does 
so at the cost of making color anti-realism unthinkable if true. If 
there are no colors, and if our color “concepts” (or whatever we use 
to apparently think about colors) are supposed to get their content 
through tracking, then we would have no concept of color, and the 
thought color realism is false would not be thinkable.23 We would not 
be able to represent to ourselves what it is that does not exist. Note 
that we cannot deny the existence of colors by justing thinking to 
ourselves that our “color” (pseudo-)representations fail to represent, 
since there is nothing that makes them pertain to colors, so, again, 
this thought will fail to tell us what it is that does not exist. One way 
to see this is to note that the thought that our (pseudo-)representa-
tions fail to represent is fully compatible with the existence of colors. 
Color anti-realism being unstatable if true is clearly absurd and a 
high price to pay to block the argument from (P1), (P2), and (REAL) 
to (C).24,25
23 The only way to avoid this consequence would to be to claim that color 
(pseudo-)concepts are obtained not through tracking, but through composition of 
other representations that do track something. But it does not seem that we rep-
resent colors through composition. In any case, we could run the same argument 
with some other (pseudo-)concept that is supposed to get its content directly 
from tracking.
24 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that empty (pseudo-)representations 
might be cases of reliable misrepresentation, and so that taking color (pseudo-)
representations to be empty would be a way for teleosemantics to allow for the re-
liable misrepresentation of color. However, empty (pseudo-)representations are 
not a kind of reliable misrepresentation, since reliable misrepresentation requires 
representation (by (RM1)), and empty (pseudo-)representations do not represent. 
Further, reliable misrepresentation requires falsity (by (RM2)), and empty (pseu-
do-)representations are arguably neither true nor false, since representing falsely 
requires representing.
25 One might suggest that there is a difference between representing and 
seeming to represent (see Millikan 1984: 326-7). Perhaps all we can conclude 
from introspection and considerations of psychological role is that our color rep-
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Artiga’s suggestion that teleosemantics can allow us to discover 
that we don’t represent colors comes dangerously close to the claim 
that what we represent should be settled by theory, a claim that is 
problematic regardless of what we think about introspective self-
knowledge. While some cases of mental representation might have 
to be settled by theory, many cases are such that we have some kind 
of theory-independent access to them. Tracking theories are theories 
of mental representation, not just theories about certain kinds of track-
ing relations. This is why they are in competition with one another 
and with other theories of mental representation. Tracking theories 
aim at a certain target, mental representation, and attempt to ac-
count for it. While there are different ways of fixing reference on 
our target, we need to have some sort of theory-independent grip on 
it in order for the disagreement between different tracking theories, 
and different theories of mental representation more generally, to be 
a genuine disagreement.26 If we had no theory-independent grip on 
mental representation, then teleosemantics and other kinds of track-
ing theories would not be in disagreement. They would each be the-
ories of their favored kinds of tracking relations and nothing more. 
They might disagree on which tracking relations are most impor-
tant, or which are useful for certain purposes, but they needn’t be in 
competition with one another. All the tracking relations they specify 
could peacefully co-exist. Since tracking theorists seem to take their 
resentations seem to represent colors. I’m not sure how to understand this claim 
other than as the claim that we represent that we represent colors. But then this 
suggestion faces the following dilemma: Either representing that we represent P 
requires representing P or it does not. (Representing that we represent P will re-
quire representing P on views of higher-order states on which lower-order states 
or their contents are embedded or otherwise involved in the higher-order states 
(see, e.g., Burge 1988), but such views of higher-order states are not mandatory.) 
If representing that we represent P requires representing P, then we can establish 
(P1) from the fact that we represent that we represent colors. If it does not, then 
this is presumably because the content representing P is not composed of other 
contents. But then we can run an amended form of the argument from (P1), (P2), 
and (REAL), to (C) where ‘redness’ is replaced with ‘representing redness’ and 
‘colors’ is replaced with ‘the representing of colors.’ Since this response accepts 
that we represent that we represent redness, it should accept that the new version 
of (P1) is true.
26 See Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2 and Mendelovici MS: ch. 1 for discussion.
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theories to be in competition, they should accept that they have a 
common target, which requires that there is a theory-independent 
way of fixing on this target.
With our theory-independent grip on mental representation come 
theory-independent ways of finding out what certain mental states 
represent. These ways might be based on introspection, intuition, or 
observations of inferences, brain states, or behaviors. Indeed, track-
ing theorists seem to accept that we have a theory-independent way 
of finding out about mental contents. This is clear in their discus-
sions of the disjunction problem. The disjunction problem arises when 
a theory of mental representation incorrectly assigns disjunctive 
contents (e.g., horse or skinny-cow-on-a-dark-night) to mental represen-
tations that don’t have disjunctive contents (e.g., horse) (see Fodor 
1987: ch. 4). In order for the disjunction problem to actually be a 
problem, we need a theory-independent way of knowing that the 
content of the relevant mental representations is not in fact disjunc-
tive. Otherwise, we could just accept that certain theories claim that 
certain (or all) contents are disjunctive. That tracking theorists tend 
not to bite the bullet on the disjunction problem shows that they ac-
cept that there are ways of finding out what a mental representation 
represents independent of a theory of mental representation. Based 
on discussions of the disjunction problem, these ways seem to be 
largely based on intuition and introspection; it’s supposed to just be 
obvious that horse doesn’t represent horse or skinny-cow-on-a-dark-night. 
All this is relevant to the argument for realism in two ways. First, 
this means that teleosemantics (or any theory of mental representa-
tion) is not free to dictate the contents of our mental states. We have 
theory-independent ways of finding out what we represent. While 
some cases of mental representation might have to be settled solely 
based on our theory, in many cases, pre-theoretical considerations 
constrain or completely inform us as to what is represented. In the 
case of perceptual experiences of colors and thoughts about colors, it 
is pre-theoretically clear that the relevant representations represent 
something. Suggesting that a tracking theory could inform us that we 
don’t represent anything is no more convincing than suggesting it 
could inform us that horse represents horse or skinny-cow-on-a-dark-
night. Tracking theorists should not bite the bullet on such cases, 
because biting these bullets is in tension with acknowledging that we 
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have a theory-independent way of finding out what our mental repre-
sentations represent, and denying that we have a theory-independent 
way of finding out what our mental representations represent is in 
tension with taking tracking theories of mental representation to ac-
tually be theories of mental representation.27
27 It is not clear that the kind of self-knowledge provided by Millikan’s theory 
(see fn. 19) provides us the kind of theory-independent grip on mental represen-
tation required to adjudicate disagreements between different theories of mental 
representation on independent grounds. Millikan’s theory of self-knowledge is a 
theory of how we come to know that two representations track the same thing, so 
it seems the insight it takes self-knowledge to provide ends up being insights onto 
what is tracked. If it turned out that her method delivered results that were at 
odds with her tracking theory, then presumably she would claim that her method 
delivered a mistake; after all, this method aims to find out whether we track the 
same thing on multiple occasions, so if its results come apart from what we in 
fact do track, we can conclude that it has made a mistake. This means that her 
method does not provide an independent means of validating the predictions of 
her theory; we could never use it find out that her theory was false.
Pietroski 1992 provides an imaginary case aimed at testing Millikan’s tele-
osemantics on independent grounds: He asks us to imagine two species, kimus, 
and their only predators, snorfs. Kimus were originally color-blind, but by ran-
dom mutation, one kimu has a representation R that is tokened in the presence 
of red light. In the morning, red light emanates from the top of a hill. Evolution 
eventually selected kimus that were fond of red light and hence would climb the 
hill every morning, thereby avoiding being eaten by snorfs, which happen to not 
be able to climb hills. Pietroski claims that Millikan’s theory delivers the wrong 
result in this case: Her account predicts that R represents the lack of snorfs, a 
snorf-free zone, or something else to do with snorfs, but, he claims, whether R 
is a representation of red light, redness, something nice, or something else, one 
thing it certainly is not a representation of is anything to do with snorfs. In mak-
ing this argument, Pietroski assumes that we have an independent way of know-
ing the contents of representational states (his favored way appeals to the role of 
mental representation in psychological explanations). Millikan bites the bullet 
on this objection, claiming that R does indeed represent something to do with 
snorfs. But if Pietroski’s case does not count as evidence against teleosemantics 
from independent considerations pertaining to the content of representational 
states, it is not clear what does.
See also Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, which argues that a naturalistic ap-
proach to mental representation requires more than reducing mental representa-
tion to the physical; it also requires being compatible with the theory-indepen-
dent empirical evidence concerning what a representation represents.
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Second, as long as the theory-independent ways of finding out 
what a representation represents don’t require ascertaining that re-
alism about a candidate represented property is true, tracking theo-
ries will license unacceptable arguments from premises like (P1) and 
(P2) to (C). In other words, even if we don’t know (P1) through 
introspection, as I claim we do, we will still be able to bypass the 
standard considerations for ascertaining realism about a represented 
property as long as we are able to establish (P1) without checking 
the surfaces of objects. So, tracking theories license inappropriate 
consequences even if we deny introspective self-knowledge. Denying 
introspective self-knowledge is not enough to make moves licensed 
by (REAL) palatable; one must also deny other theory-independent 
ways of finding out what our mental representations represent. But 
denying that we have theory-independent ways of finding out what 
our mental representations represent is in tension with taking track-
ing theories to actually be theories of mental representation.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve overviewed, clarified, and improved various as-
pects of the argument from reliable misrepresentation against track-
ing theories. I’ve also presented and responded to certain objections 
made in Artiga 2013. If my arguments are sound, the argument from 
reliable misrepresentation escapes Artiga’s objections, and tracking 
theories still need to allow for clean cases of reliable representation.
I will close by summarizing my complaint against tracking theo-
ries, and against teleosemantics in particular, in an intuitive way: 
There could be cases in which we keep track of some worldly prop-
erty, A (say, surface reflectance profiles), but we do this by repre-
senting “to ourselves” something else, B (say, primitive colors). Per-
haps we need to keep track of A, but we do not need to know just 
what property it is, so it does not matter whether it is A or B that 
we represent. It might even be easier or more economical for us to 
represent B rather than A, perhaps because A is highly complex, while 
B is not. All this could be as it should be by any standard other than 
veridicality: the setup could be useful for us and our ancestors, and 
it could result is as strong a connection between our representations 
and B as we please. It need not be an accident or a byproduct of some 
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other of our useful features. Teleosemantics, and tracking theories 
in general, inappropriately rule out this possibility on the basis of 
theory alone. But it is a live empirical possibility, one that should be 
left open by any theory, especially one claiming to be naturalistic.28
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